SECRET acquiesce. Even so there would be resistance from irregular guerrilla forces. (f) The Soviet leaders would not wish to provoke Finnish resistance more than was necessary. They would probably consider that their land and naval requirements would be met by the use of road and rail routes in the North and certain naval bases on the west coast of Finland. The airfields near these routes and bases would give a certain amount of protection against Allied bombers. Once Soviet forces had occupied ports on the east coast of Sweden the Soviet leaders would no doubt case the load on communications in Finland by shipping supplies across the Gulf of Bothnia, except from January to April, when it is ice-locked.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Finland Germany Norway Russia Soviet Union Sweden USSR
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/15/21
- Document Types
- Report Memorandum Map
- File Reference
- CAB 158/15
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0015.021
- Keywords
- Threat Of War With The Ussr Contingency Planning Assessing Enemy Strength Predicting Enemy Intentions War Preparations Geographic Intelligence Alliances Eastern Bloc Coup D’état Subversion Underground Resistance Topographical Intelligence Climate Military Operations Transportation Communications Roads Railways Ports Airfields Naval Bases
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Staff Ministry of Defence Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 12
- Persons Discussed
- Anthony Buzzard Charles Carstairs Patrick Dean Francis Fressanges Arthur Shortt Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
