SECRET GUARD formations within the coastal area and augment their air defences there. They may also move their navy to a position south of the Chusan archipelago from where it would be able to put to sea at a suitable opportunity in order to attack Nationalist warships engaged in blockade or in escorting amphibious operations. We do not think that any of these reactions would affect Chinese forces in Korea, or in the vicinity of Indo-China or Hong Kong. 11. If the Nationalists do increase their activities the Communists will almost certainly take the general precautions described in para 10, if they have not already taken them.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Burma China Formosa Indochina Korea
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/15/17
- Document Types
- Report Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 158/15
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0015.017
- Keywords
- Military Intelligence Predicting Enemy Intentions Assessing Enemy Strength War Preparations Military Operations Chinese Nationalists Chinese Foreign Policy Contingency Planning Resources Military Strength Blockades Economic Warfare Mines Naval Warfare Chinese Navy Air Power Chinese Air Force Naval Strength
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Ministry of Defence Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 9
- Persons Discussed
- Anthony Buzzard Patrick Reilly Eric Searight
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
