TOP SECRET 3 that either side, when faced with a choice between abandoning particular objectives d taking further military action to restore the position, would bank on the other's ctance to spread the war. On the Russian side this might lead them eventually take more positive measures than the military situation warranted. As the campaign developed Russian intervention would become more positive the nearer hostilities came to their frontier and the nearer China came to serious reverses.]* 14. If the U.N.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Burma Ceylon China Formosa France India Indochina Indonesia Japan Korea Netherlands North Korea Pakistan Poland Russia South Korea Soviet Union United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/14/59
- Document Types
- Report Map Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 158/14
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0014.059
- Keywords
- Military Intelligence Military Objectives Chinese Foreign Policy Communism Contingency Planning Predicting Enemy Intentions War Preparations Military Operations Hong Kong Subversion Economy Economic Warfare Bombing Communications Communications Disruption Naval Warfare Naval Strength Blockades Ports Trade Soviet-chinese Relations Soviet Foreign Policy Atomic Warfare
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Ministry of Defence United Nations Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 33
- Persons Discussed
- Francis Fressanges Patrick Reilly Eric Searight Arthur Shortt
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
