SECRET 4. Para. 5 We are not at all clear as to what our three lines consist of. With our lack of reserves, we doubt whether we have the depth to be entirely satisfied with our defensive positions on any of the lines as we know them. 5. Para. 7(a) Air Power. This statement is not wholly true, since the need remains to ensure that the Communists cannot bring into use airfields in North Korea from which their air forces might be brought effectively into the battle. (b) Armour and Artillery. We know so little about the Communist armour that we do not wish to make such a confident prediction.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Korean War
- Countries
- Korea North Korea
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/14/49
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 158/14
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0014.049
- Keywords
- Military Intelligence Military Situation Reports Strategy Manpower Military Strength Assessing Enemy Strength Air Power Air Warfare War Materials Armaments Tanks Artillery Predicting Enemy Intentions Military Operations
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Ministry of Defence Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 4
- Persons Discussed
- Anthony Buzzard Francis Fressanges Patrick Reilly Eric Searight Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
