(ii) The Soviet Union, even at the end of 1956, will still be subject to a number of economic weaknesses. But from this date onwards the Soviet leaders may be prepared to risk a war in spite of these weaknesses. (b) Military, including Weapons of Mass Destruction. (i) As the Soviet Army is likely to remain so large and the Soviet Navy so small in relation to the Anglo-Saxon forces it is probable that the size of these forces will not affect the likelihood of the Soviet Leaders deciding to risk a major war.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Albania Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Estonia Finland Germany Hungary Korea Latvia Mongolia Pakistan Persia Poland Romania Russia Soviet Union United Kingdom Yugoslavia
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/3/13
- Document Types
- Memorandum Report
- File Reference
- CAB 158/3
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0003.013
- Keywords
- Threat Of War With The Ussr Contingency Planning War Preparations Predicting Enemy Intentions Economy Military Strength Assessing Enemy Strength Air Power Naval Strength Soviet Satellite States Soviet Strategy Soviet Foreign Policy Industry Oil Resources Soviet Army Soviet Air Force Soviet Navy Nuclear Weapons Biological Warfare Chemical Warfare
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Staff Joint Planning Staff Ministry of Defence Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 10
- Persons Discussed
- Paul Gleadell William Hayter Douglas Packard Edward Parry Lawrence Pendred Josef Stalin Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- International Relations Military Intelligence
